Checkpoints and the Constitution a Mini Review
Have you ever wondered why we rarely see DUI checkpoints in Jefferson County and why, when there are checkpoints the plans to have one and where it will be are published before hand? I did and so I did a little legal research.
The authorities in this county, in my opinion seem to be under the impression that license checks, sobriety checkpoints and roadblocks are unconstitutional. They are not, so long as the stop is “reasonable.” Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 562, 96 S.Ct. at 3085. See also United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1573, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985) ("[t]he Fourth Amendment is not, of course, a guarantee against all searches and seizures, but only against unreasonable searches and seizures"). "License checks, sobriety checkpoints, and roadblocks are not intrinsically unconstitutional." McInnish v. State, 584 So.2d 935, 936 (Ala.Cr.App.1991).
From what I have gathered reading WV case law is that WV courts distinguish between checkpoint roadblocks for determining proper license and registration and sobriety checkpoints. Sobriety checkpoints must be done according to WV policy, West Virginia Department of Public Safety guidelines and procedures. Nonetheless, in a West VA case, State v. Davis, 195 W.Va. 79, 464 S.E.2d 598 the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia found that a checkpoint for license and registration at midnight was legal and did not present 4th amendment issues that would require that the evidence against the defendant be suppressed. In other words, the Court found that the stop was not a “sobriety checkpoint” even though it occurred at night.
The State (a/k/a the local police) testified that the stop was not a sobriety checkpoint, but rather was a roadblock for checking license and registration. The Court agreed that it was not a “sobriety” check point and thus subject to WVA policy for such stop, even though the license and registration checks took place in a town at midnight, so long as the police stopped every car briefly. Although there is no clear discussion in the case that publication about the checkpoint occurred, the Defendant argued that the stop was not according to WVA sobriety checkpoint policies. The Court said that did not matter as it was not a “sobriety” checkpoint.
The court said:
“While police officers may enforce the licensing and registration laws for drivers and motor vehicles respectively by routine checks of licenses and registrations, such checks must be done according to some non-discriminatory, random, pre-conceived plan such as established check points or examination of vehicles with particular number or letter configurations on a given day; accordingly, detention of vehicles without probable cause to believe that a registration is irregular absent a random, non-discriminatory, preconceived plan is contrary to the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and W.Va. Constitution, art. 3, sec. 6." Syl. pt. 5, State v. Frisby, 161 W.Va. 734, 245 S.E.2d 622 (1978).
In prior WV case, the Court held that the weight of authority is that, without violating constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures, motorists may be stopped for no other reason than examination of licenses and registrations when such examinations are done on a random basis pursuant to a preconceived plan, such as the stopping of every car at a check point[.]" State v. Frisby, 161 W.Va. at 738, 245 S.E.2d at 625.
The Frisby case, above, did not involve a sobriety checkpoint roadblock. However, there is another WVA case, Carte v. Cline, 194 W.Va. 233, 460 S.E.2d 48 (1995), that does involve a sobriety checkpoint . In Carte, a driver was stopped at a sobriety checkpoint roadblock near Belle, West Virginia. During the stop, a State Trooper detected the odor of alcohol in the car and noted the driver's slurred speech and bloodshot eyes. Subsequently, the driver was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol, and his driver's license was revoked.
In Carte, the driver challenged the revocation of his license by asserting that the use of sobriety checkpoints violated constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures. In addition, the driver asserted that the State Police in establishing the roadblock failed to follow their own guidelines and procedures concerning sobriety checkpoint roadblocks.
Although, in Carte, the Court remanded the case (sent the case back to the County trial court) for a determination of whether the State Police guidelines and procedures had been followed, the Court held, that: "Sobriety checkpoint roadblocks are constitutional when conducted within predetermined operational guidelines which minimize the intrusion on the individual and mitigate the discretion vested in police officers at the scene."
The Carte Court explained that it based that finding on a decision of the United States Supreme Court, Michigan v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990). In Sitz, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a Michigan highway sobriety checkpoint program against a Fourth Amendment challenge. The U.S. Supreme Court has said that:
"The state's interest in enforcing its registration and licensing laws and the difficulty in enforcing the laws by any other method," "the federal government's interest in enforcement of the immigration laws," id., and the state's interest in eradicating drunk driving, Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451-52, 110 S.Ct. at 2485-86; Cains, 555 So.2d at 294, have all been held sufficient to outweigh a minor intrusion upon persons stopped at roadblocks conducted for those purposes.
I found an Alabama Court that analyzed the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in several cases and summarized those holdings. Although Alabama law does not necessarily apply to WVA courts, the Alabama case summarizes the laws of several states and provides a good discussion of their differences and the application of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions to state laws. The Alabama Court concluded that:
"random stops or spot checks [of vehicles] are unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing; on the other hand, stops [of vehicles] at fixed checkpoints or roadblocks are reasonable if they are carried out pursuant to a neutral and objective plan, are supported by a strong public interest, and are only minimally intrusive to the individual motorist."
Cains, 555 So.2d at 293 (1989) and Hagood v. Town of Town Creek, 628 So.2d 1057, 62 USLW 2215 (Ala.Crim.App. Sep 03, 1993), citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975), Martinez-Fuerte, Prouse, and Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983),
The Supreme Court set out test in Brown v. Texas that is used to determine whether a roadblock/checkpoint is unreasonable, which considers, balancing the public interest advanced by the roadblock and "the degree of intrusion on the individual motorist." Cains, 555 So.2d at 294. That test requires "a weighing of the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty." Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 at 50-51, 99 S.Ct. 2637 at 2640, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979), quoted in Cains, 555 So.2d at 294.
When this test has been applied to determine whether a roadblock, such as a sobriety checkpoint, license and registration checkpoint is constitutionally sufficient, a roadblock that was "established on a well-traveled route” served a a great “public interest in promoting highway safety by detecting, removing, and prosecuting drunk drivers, this interest was adequately advanced by a checkpoint at "a time and place at which it is likely that drunk drivers would be found," and that these factors outweighed the minimal intrusion to those stopped. In reaching this conclusion the court noted that the law enforcement officers stopped every vehicle in both lanes of traffic and asked the driver for his or her license. If there were no problems, the vehicle was waved on. "The duration of each stop was for 'five, ten seconds or so, just long enough to pull out their license." Cains, 555 So.2d at 291.
Less than nine months after Cains, the United States Supreme Court again addressed the question of roadblocks in Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz. At issue in Sitz were sobriety checkpoints conducted under guidelines established by the Sobriety Checkpoint Advisory Committee appointed by the Director of the Michigan Department of State Police. The Court held that the Brown v. Texas balancing test was the correct method to determine the reasonableness of the checkpoints. 496 U.S. at 450, 110 S.Ct. at 2485. After observing that "[n]o one can seriously dispute the magnitude of the drunken driving problem or the States' interest in eradicating it," 496 U.S. at 451, 110 S.Ct. at 2485, the Court concluded: "[T]he State's interest in preventing drunken driving, the extent to which this system can reasonably be said to advance that interest, and the degree of intrusion upon individual motorists who are briefly stopped, weighs in favor of the state program." 496 U.S. at 455, 110 S.Ct. at 2488.
It is clear from Sitz and Cains that the particular purpose of or governmental interest to be served by a roadblock is a critical factor in assessing whether the roadblock was reasonable. That particular purpose or interest "must be sufficient to outweigh the invasion of privacy occasioned by the roadblock-style stop." 1 W. Ringel, Searches & Seizures, Arrests & Confessions § 11.6(c) at 11-45 (2d ed. 1991). "The state's interest in enforcing its registration and licensing laws and the difficulty in enforcing the laws by any other method," "the federal government's interest in enforcement of the immigration laws," id., and the state's interest in eradicating drunk driving, Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451-52, 110 S.Ct. at 2485-86; Cains, 555 So.2d at 294, have all been held sufficient to outweigh a minor intrusion upon persons stopped at roadblocks conducted for those purposes.
So why don’t these checkpoints happen more frequently in Jefferson County, particularly at night? Good question.
Why don’t we see a summary of crime reports and arrests for the week either in the Spirit or on this website?
Why don’t we see follow-up by the prosecuting authorities on DUI arrests or for that matter, on any arrests?
Watch Jefferson County
Comments
DUI Stops
The number of DUI related incidents for January 2006 through July 2006 was about 40. If the number is the same for the second half of the year, there have probably been about 75 - 90 stops this year by the JCSD. I have no idea how many by the State Police and other local juristictions. Many of the DUI incidents are reported on the major State roads so it may be reasonable to assume that the State Police have recorded at least a similar number of DUI incidents, if not more.
Checkpoints
I do know that there have been checkpoints established by the JCSD from time to time to check for out of state tags and registration - people trying to avoid paying the tax on vehicles brought into the state.
Would a sobriety checkpoint fall under the jurisdiction of the JCSD or the State Police?
Checkpoints
From reading WVA cases, it seems any police unit - County, City, State can have either a sobriety checkpoint or a license and registration checkpoint. What I gathered from the cases was that a license and registration checkpoint can also serve as a sobriety checkpoint - if a person under the influence happens to pass through. The license and registration checkpoints require less to conform to WVA policy - it seems. So a checkpoint by another name can be OK and easier to implement (maybe?) However, I have not been able to find a copy of the policy referenced in the WVA case.
Katherine